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Abstract: Structural realists of nearly all stripes endorse the structural continuity 
claim. Roughly speaking, this is the claim that the structure of successful scientific 
theories survives theory change because it has latched on to the structure of the world. 
In this paper I elaborate, elucidate and modify the structural continuity claim and its 
associated argument. I do so without presupposing a particular conception of structure 
that favours this or that kind of structural realism. Instead I focus on how structural 
realists can best account for the neutrally formulated historical facts. The result, I 
hope, crystallises some of the shared commitments, desiderata and limits of structural 
realists. 
 
1. Introduction 
Structural realism comes in various shapes and sizes. First there is the epistemic kind 
which holds that at best we can have knowledge of the structure of the world. This 
comes in two main flavours: à la Ramsey (e.g. John Worrall and Elie Zahar 2001) 
claiming that the structure of the world is reflected in the Ramsey sentence of 
successful scientific theories and à la Russell (e.g. Ioannis Votsis 2005) claiming that 
we can infer certain things about the structure of the world from the structure of our 
perceptions. Then there is the ontic kind which also comes in a multitude of flavours, 
three of which stand out: (i) the ‘no objects view’ (e.g. James Ladyman 1998) 
according to which there exist no objects only structures, (ii) the ‘no individuals view’ 
(e.g. Steven French and Decio Krause 2006) which maintains that there exist no 
individuals but only non-individual objects and structures and (iii) the ‘no intrinsic 
natures view’ (e.g. Ladyman 2007) which eliminates intrinsic natures in favour of 
haecceity-free individuals and structures.1 Finally, there is the methodological kind 
which concentrates on the role shared structure plays in characterising scientific 
theories, in relating high-level theory to low-level data and in identifying links 
between predecessor and successor theories (see Katherine Brading and Elaine 
Landry 2006).  
 
That the different kinds of structural realism share less than their name suggests is 
something that is increasingly becoming apparent.2 One major disagreement relates to 
the way structure gets demarcated. It is not merely a question of which formal tools 
are best equipped for the job, e.g. Ramseyfication, set theory, group-theory, category 
theory, etc. It is also a question of how we draw the line between the structural and 
the non-structural. For example, some circumscribe the structural so as to include 
                                                 
1
 Concerning the ‘no objects view’, Ladyman insists he never intended to say that no objects exist. He 
admits, however, that certain of his early pronouncements have contributed to this misinterpretation. 
2
 In a recent workshop on structural realism organised in Banff by Elaine Landry, Ladyman urged the 
participants, who parenthetically represented almost the whole spectrum of different structural realist 
positions and included most of the main players, to find a mutually agreeable formulation of what is 
common to all. What became clear by the end of the workshop was that no such formulation can easily 
be produced. 
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structural information about intrinsic properties (e.g. Votsis), while others deny the 
very existence of intrinsic properties (e.g. Ladyman). 
 
Disagreements aside, all structural realists (bar perhaps the methodological ones) 
appropriate the preservation of structure through historical theory change as evidence 
for their respective views. They thus endorse what I will henceforth call ‘the structural 
continuity claim’. Roughly put, this is the claim that the structure of successful 
scientific theories survives theory change in virtue of the fact that it correctly reflects 
structural features of the world. In other words, structures are preserved through 
theory change on account of their truth or approximate truth – hereafter designated by 
‘(approximate) truth’. 
 
The structural continuity claim makes its debut appearance in Henri Poincaré’s 
Science and Hypothesis. As John Worrall (1989) first pointed out, Poincaré utilises 
the structural continuity claim to motivate a version of epistemic structural realism.3 
Poincaré argues that only structural features of theories survive theory change and the 
reason for their survival is that they have somehow latched on to the structure of the 
world. He cites the preservation of Augustin-Jean Fresnel’s equations in James Clerk 
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory as evidence for that claim. The equations 
successfully describe the reflection and refraction of light when it is passing through 
media of different refractive indices. Under Fresnel’s interpretation, light consists of 
vibrations that are transmitted through the ether, a ubiquitous yet virtually 
imperceptible material medium. Of crucial importance is the fact that Fresnel’s 
interpretation of the nature of light is not necessary for the empirical exploitation of 
Maxwell’s equations and, a fortiori, not necessary for the empirical exploitation of 
Fresnel’s own equations since the latter can be derived from the former. It is no 
wonder then that the interpretation is made redundant in Maxwell’s mature 
electromagnetic theory. This is taken by Poincaré and subsequent structural realists to 
mean that Fresnel’s (and Maxwell’s) equations provide at most a structural account of 
light. 
 
Let us now reconstruct the argument whose conclusion is the more polished structural 
continuity claim: 
  
1. Only structural elements of predictively and explanatorily successful scientific 
theories have been (and will be) preserved through theory change. 
2. Preservation of an element implies its (approximate) truth. 
3. Non-preservation of an element implies its (approximate) falsity. 
∴   The preservation of structural elements of predictively and explanatorily 
successful scientific theories through theory change implies their 
(approximate) truth. The non-preservation of non-structural elements implies 
their (approximate) falsity. 
 
A few qualifications are in order. First, by ‘elements’ I mean statements about the 
world that have a truth value. Structural elements are truth-valued statements whose 
content is purely structural. Second, for most structural realists this ‘purely structural’ 
clause concerns only the unobservables. What counts as an unobservable differs in 
                                                 
3
 The structural continuity claim is not the sole motivation for Poincaré’s epistemic structural realism 
as I indicate in Votsis (2004, ch. 2). 
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some of these accounts. Third, since different conceptions of structure may lead to 
different formulations of this argument I have formulated the argument in the most 
general way possible, i.e. without specifying where to draw the line between structure 
and non-structure. After all, structural realists of different stripes agree on the relevant 
historical facts when they are neutrally stated, e.g. that a set of equations belonging to 
some past theory is derivable from its successor. Their disagreement lies only in the 
interpretation of such facts as evidence for their specific brand of structural realism.  
 
In this paper I aim to elucidate, improve and extend the structural continuity claim 
and its associated argument. In so doing, I will not presuppose a particular conception 
of structure that favours this or that kind of structural realism but will instead focus on 
how structural realists can best handle the neutrally formulated historical facts. A 
positive consequence of this approach is that the results will be pertinent to both 
epistemic and ontic structural realists. A negative consequence is that various 
significant issues, such as how best to draw the structure vs. non-structure distinction 
as well as whether the distinction is even feasible (questioned, for example, in Bas 
van Fraassen 2006, p. 290 and in Stathis Psillos 1999, p. 157) will be left untouched.4 
My intended audience is therefore those who at least provisionally accept that the 
structure vs. non-structure distinction can be drawn but are unclear about the details – 
those that are independent of the particular form of the distinction – of the structural 
continuity claim and its associated argument.  
 
2. Not all Structures are Preserved 
Not all structures are created equal. Some play no active role in the predictive and 
explanatory success of a theory because they do not correspond to any structure in the 
world. Their non-preservation does not therefore encumber the structural realist. 
Traditional scientific realists have long employed a distinction between essential and 
idle posits to weed out those elements of theories that played no substantial role in 
their predictive and explanatory success. An analogous distinction is required for the 
structural realists. Henceforth I will brand operative those structures that are 
responsible for a theory’s genuine predictive and explanatory success. Those that fail 
this condition, I will brand inoperative. 
 
Under the foregoing characterisation Fresnel’s equations count as operative structural 
elements, for they are arguably the sole purveyors of the success enjoyed by Fresnel’s 
theory of light. More examples of operative structural elements will be discussed in 
the sections below. For now let us consider an example of an inoperative structural 
element. Such examples are plentiful in the history of science. After all, most 
conjectures are likely to be predictively and explanatorily unsuccessful.5 Take August 
Weismann’s claim that different cells contain different components of hereditary 
material and are distributed to different parts of an organism’s body so as to locally 
oversee that part’s development. In his bid to defeat structural realism, Kyle Stanford 
(2006, p. 181) offers Weismann’s claim as an example of a structural element from 
biology that did not survive theory change. Contra Stanford, we can simply point out 
that Weismann’s claim did not enjoy genuine predictive success. Thus Weismann’s 
claim is not merely a structural element that did not survive theory change but also an 
                                                 
4
 I have defended a version of the structure vs. non-structure distinction in Votsis (2007). 
5
 Construing such conjectures structurally does nothing to reverse this unsuccessfulness. 
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inoperative element. For this reason its abandonment does not threaten the structural 
realist. 
 
Modified accordingly, premise one now reads as follows. 
 
1a. All and only operative structural elements of scientific theories have been (and 
will be) preserved through theory change. 
 
Two provisos need to be made here. First, the clause ‘predictively and explanatorily 
successful’ is now packaged inside the concept operative. Second, the reformulation 
makes clear that not only are all predictively and explanatorily successful elements 
that survive structures, but also that all predictively and explanatorily successful 
structures survive. 
 
3. Not all Preserved Structures are Intact 
As many authors have rightly pointed out the neat preservation of structure exhibited 
by the Fresnel-Maxwell case is atypical in the history of science (e.g. Michael 
Redhead 2001).6 More often a structure belonging to a superseded theory can be 
recovered only as a limiting case of a successor theory’s structure. Aware of this, 
Worrall (1989) reasoned that structural realism benefits from ‘limiting case’ survival 
when appeal is made to the correspondence principle. According to Heinz Post’s 
formulation, “this is the requirement that any acceptable new theory L should account 
for its predecessor S by ‘degenerating’ into that theory under those conditions under 
which S has been well confirmed by tests” (1971, p. 228). Worrall notes that given 
that the principle operates solely on the mathematical level its applicability “is not 
evidence for full-blown realism – but, instead, only for structural realism” (1989, p. 
161). 
 
A refinement of premise one that takes into consideration the need to employ the 
correspondence principle takes the following form:  
 
1b. All and only operative structural elements of scientific theories have been (and 
will be) preserved through theory change either intact by derivation or suitably 
modified in accordance with the correspondence principle.  
 
Worrall’s remarks on the link between the correspondence principle and structural 
realism are rather brief and suggestive. Luckily, Redhead has made some progress on 
this front. 
 
Consider a one-parameter family of structures {Sp} where the parameter p is a 
continuously variable real number. Let us suppose for values of p unequal to zero the 
structures Sp are all qualitatively the same, as p varies the structure changes, but in a 
continuous way. But suppose the change in structure suffers a discontinuity at the point 
p=0, S0 is qualitatively distinct from all the Sp with p≠0. We may say that the family of 
structures is stable for p≠0, but exhibits a singularity at p=0 (ibid., p. 86) [original 
emphasis]. 
 
                                                 
6
 It is atypical but not unique. Several structures postulated within the framework of the caloric theory 
of heat have survived the theory’s demise and are still with us today, e.g. Sadi Carnot’s principle of 
maximum efficiency. 
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Redhead thus identifies two kinds of structure transformations: continuous and 
discontinuous.7 Whether or not a structure transformation is discontinuous depends on 
what makes a structure the kind of structure it is, i.e. what we deem to be its essential 
(read: defining) features. Redhead offers an instructive example from geometry. 
Think of transforming a circle on a Euclidean plane into any closed curve. Suppose 
the essential features in this case are the following: (a) that the shape completely 
encloses an area and (b) that it has no endpoints. Since these two conditions are 
essential features of closed curves (including circles), the transformation is continuous 
with respect to the relevant group of homeomorphisms. Contrast this with the 
transformation of any closed curve (including a circle) into a straight line. In this case 
(a) and (b) are lost and so the transformation qualifies as discontinuous. 
 
In his example Redhead neglects to highlight that some continuous transformations 
can easily be turned into discontinuous ones if the appropriate essential features are 
available. Think of the circle-to-closed curve transformation again. One of the 
defining characteristics of circles is that they possess a unique point equidistant from 
the set of points that bounds them, i.e. a centre. Modulo this essential feature the 
aforementioned transformation becomes discontinuous as no other closed curves 
share this feature with circles.  
 
As it stands, the notion of discontinuous transformation fails to do justice to the 
varying degrees of discontinuity. For example, there is a clear sense in which the 
circle-to-closed curve transformation is less discontinuous than the circle-to-straight 
line transformation. To redress this issue we need to establish a more fine-grained 
account of discontinuous transformations. A first step in the right direction is to divide 
the original notion into two notions: ‘partially discontinuous’ and ‘fully 
discontinuous’. The first notion applies when the transformation brings about the loss 
of some but not all of the essential features that a structure possesses. In general, the 
less essential features lost the more continuous the transformation. The second notion 
applies when all essential features are lost. Changes of this magnitude make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to claim that successor structures have a non-accidental 
kinship to predecessor structures.8 Although refinements to these notions and perhaps 
even additional notions are required to deal with further problems, e.g. some essential 
features may be more essential than others and hence will need to be differentially 
weighted, the two notions will do for the purposes of this paper. 
 
At this point it is worth asking how the different kinds of structure transformations fit 
into the puzzle of relating old and new structures. The simple answer is that they are 
either all exemplified in the history of science or they could be so exemplified. Since 
discontinuous transformations are quite prevalent in modern physics and indeed more 
challenging to legitimate as genuine cases of substantial (albeit partial) continuity I 
will focus the discussion on them. To explain the rationale behind such 
transformations, imagine, as a first approximation, a successor structure as typically 
possessing one or more additional parameters than its predecessor. We can think of 
the predecessor structure as a more abstract, less approximately true, more idealised 
                                                 
7
 Though not a structural realist, Robert Batterman (2002, pp. 17-19) draws a similar distinction 
between reduction (where the limit is regular) and intertheoretic relations (where it is singular). 
8
 It may still be possible that two structures are somehow partially continuous on the basis of non-
defining features. I mention this only as food for thought as I do not really put much trust in the claim 
that continuity of this kind is sufficient for (structural) realist purposes. 
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version of the successor structure (e.g. Wladyslaw Krajewski 1977). Neutralising 
these parameters from the successor structure thereby allows us to recover the 
predecessor one. In the above framework, the neutralisation of a parameter is 
achieved by suitably modifying its value, e.g. by setting it to zero. Assuming, as it 
seems we must, that the parameter at issue corresponds to an essential feature of the 
successor structure entails that neutralising it amounts to the removal of that feature 
and hence to a discontinuous transformation. In cases where some essential features 
survive the transformation we can speak of partial continuity or discontinuity. When 
all essential features are lost we can speak of full discontinuity. Only fully 
discontinuous transformations are undesirable for the task of supporting structural 
realism. 
 
We are now in a position to unveil a bespoke correspondence relation for the 
structural realist:  
 
A structure S´ and its predecessor structure S correspond if and only if with respect to 
a given parameter class there is a transformation from S´ to S that is either (a) 
continuous or (b) partially discontinuous.  
 
It is no doubt time for an example. Redhead cites the relation between Minkowskian 
and Galilean space-times as a prominent example of a discontinuous transformation. 
What kind of a discontinuous transformation is it? One of the essential features of 
Minkowski space-time is that it allows for a non-singular metric which is represented 
by the matrix diagonal (1, - 1/c2, - 1/c2, - 1/c2), where c is the speed of light in a 
vacuum. Since the metric is non-singular, the above matrix diagonal has an inverse, 
namely (1, -c2, -c2, -c2). If we let c=∞, 1/c = 0 and the metric becomes singular, since 
the corresponding matrix diagonal (1, 0, 0, 0) allows no inverse. By doing so, 
relativity of simultaneity disappears and we recover Galilean space-time. The fact that 
several essential features of Minkowski space-time survive the transformation, e.g. 
the structure still forbids absolute velocity and absolute spatial separation, entails that 
the transformation is only partially discontinuous. Thus the relation between 
Minkowski and Galilean space-times counts as evidence for the structural continuity 
claim as the transformation preserves some essential features in its wake. 
 
In light of our discussion of discontinuous transformations, I suggest that we modify 
the first premise thus:  
 
1c. All and only operative structural elements of scientific theories have been (and 
will be) preserved through theory change either intact by derivation or via a 
transformation from new to old structure that is either (i) continuous or (ii) partially 
discontinuous. 
 
What makes discontinuous transformations capable of supporting the structural 
continuity claim? Astonishingly, one finds little by way of argument in Redhead’s 
otherwise fecund paper. He resorts to metaphorical language, claiming that, if, like the 
mathematician, we see how natural the leap is to introduce or remove a feature from a 
structure, then we realise that discontinuous transformations of structures in physics 
are cases of structure preservation (ibid., p. 88). Discontinuous transformations must 
be put on firmer footing than this. I have already intimated how this may be done. The 
introduction of the two notions of discontinuous transformation brings out the fact 
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some transformations are unreservedly radical while others less so. Surely the latter 
are capable of supporting the structural continuity claim for they display constancy 
with respect to some essential features between old and new structures. To stress this 
point in a different way, just think how improbable it would be that any two structures 
accidentally happen to be connected via partially discontinuous transformations. To 
test this, take an algorithm that generates (pseudo-) random pairs of structures. 
Because a great many structures share no essential features at all, the odds of getting a 
pair that corresponds via partially discontinuous transformations are very small. 
 
4. Not all Structures have Predecessors  
Not all successor equations have limiting case analogues in the predecessor theory. 
Hans Radder (1996) cites the relativistic equation E = m0c2 for a particle’s energy 
with rest mass m0. No analogue of it exists in classical mechanics so any talk of 
structure transformation from new to old theory would be pointless. Radder and other 
philosophers tout this fact as detrimental to the correspondence principle. Since the 
structural continuity claim banks on the principle, the objection threatens to derail 
structural realism itself.  
 
A more careful look at the correspondence principle reveals how remarkably easy it is 
to answer this objection. It is merely a matter of revealing how the objection 
confounds the scope of the principle. The principle does not require that all 
(successful) successor structures correspond to (successful) predecessor structures. 
Let’s not forget that in the (structural) realist’s eyes successor theories will venture 
beyond their predecessors, describing and predicting new classes of phenomena with 
the help of completely new structures. What the principle requires is that all 
(successful) predecessor structures correspond to (successful) successor structures. As 
such the objection leaves the correspondence principle unfazed. 
 
5. Kuhn Loss 
The term ‘Kuhn loss’ seems to have been coined by Post (ibid.). He quotes a relevant 
passage from Kuhn who says “new paradigms seldom or never possess all the 
capabilities of their predecessors” ([1962]1996, p. 169). What does Kuhn mean by 
capabilities? His scattered thoughts on the matter seem to mostly point to the 
capability of explaining phenomena. For example he speaks of the loss of such 
capabilities in terms of the new paradigm being deprived of “some actual and much 
potential explanatory power” and of its “failure to explain” ([1962]1996, p. 107). If 
such losses exist, they seem to undermine the realist claim that successor theories 
incorporate all of the successes of their predecessors and hence are strictly more 
approximately true than their predecessors. How does this affect the structural 
continuity claim? Suppose such losses were operative structural elements. Under this 
supposition it would no longer be true that all operative structural elements survive 
theory change and therefore the structural continuity claim would be false. 
 
There are two main readings of Kuhn’s view. According to the narrow reading, 
offered by Post, a Kuhn loss is the “loss of successful explanatory power” (ibid., p. 
229) [emphasis added]. Post goes on to clarify that Kuhn-losses are those well-
confirmed parts of a superseded theory that were not saved in its successor and rejects 
that any such losses ever occur (p. 230). By contrast, Alexander Bird’s interpretation 
of Kuhn’s view is more relaxed, requiring only that a phenomenon “in an earlier 
period was held to be successfully explained” (2004) [emphasis added]. As we shall 
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shortly see the controversy over the occurrence of Kuhn-losses hinges on how widely 
one reads the loss of explanatory power. 
 
Let us first consider the wide notion of Kuhn loss. Thus defined the notion has various 
historical instantiations. A frequently discussed example concerns the loss by 
Newtonians of the Cartesian ability to explain why “the planets lie in approximately 
the same plane” and why “planets orbit the sun in the same direction [and indeed in 
the same direction as the Sun’s spin]” (James McAllister 2007, p. 18).9 According to 
this explanation the planets and any other celestial objects for that matter (including 
comets) are kept in orbit around a star by hitching a ride on the same fluid vortex. As 
the vortex turns only in one direction so do the objects that ride on it.  
  
The explanation was certainly ‘held to be successful’ by some and hence qualifies as 
an instantiation of the wide notion of Kuhn loss. It does not, however, qualify as an 
instantiation of the narrow notion since the explanation was never well-confirmed. 
Over hundreds of years no such thing as a fluid vortex has ever been detected. 
Moreover, there are positive reasons to reject the Cartesian explanation because it 
does not account for the following anomalies. Various objects in our solar system, e.g. 
Neptune’s moon Triton as well as comet Halley, travel in the opposite direction to the 
Sun’s spin. The same irregularities seem to hold for solar systems other than our own. 
A recently discovered exoplanet (WASP-17b) is the first known to travel against its 
star’s rotation.10 That the orbit of objects in a solar system all lie in approximately the 
same plane is also falsified by the existence of objects like the dwarf planet Pluto 
whose orbit is highly inclined. 
 
The above problems clearly illustrate that the Cartesian explanation was never a 
serious contender. We still do not have a well-confirmed explanation regarding the 
orbits of objects around stars.11 Realists (structural or otherwise) need explanations, 
but not those lacking robust empirical merits. In sum, although the Cartesian 
explanation qualifies as a Kuhn loss, under the wide construal of the notion, it is not 
the kind of loss that could challenge the cumulativity of scientific knowledge, or, in 
the case at hand, the structural continuity claim. 
 
Let us then consider the narrow notion of Kuhn loss, i.e. the one that demands 
genuine empirical success from the lost ability. Despite all the commotion 
surrounding Kuhn loss, finding examples that satisfy this stronger notion is not an 
easy task. Radder (ibid., p. 63) puts forth Poiseuille’s law as one – the only one it 
seems – such example. The law Q = pir4P/8ηL determines an (nearly) incompressible 
fluid’s rate of laminar flow Q along a tube as a relation between the following 
quantities: the fluid’s viscosity η, the radius r and length L of the tube and the 
pressure difference between the tube’s two ends P. The law is arguably a structural 
element, as it requires no specific ontological interpretation of the involved quantities. 
It is also an operative element since it has been used to provide explanations and 
accurate quantitative predictions in a number of different domains including medicine 
where it is used to calculate blood flow. Crucially, and according to Radder, it is 
impossible to reproduce this law from quantum mechanical accounts of fluids. It thus 
                                                 
9
 For a similar point see also Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1993, p. 261). 
10
 It is worth noting that we currently have evidence for the orbits of only around a dozen exoplanets. 
11
 We only have a tentative account in the guise of the nebular hypothesis which provides sketches of 
the formation and evolution of solar systems. 
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seems to be a bona fide case of Kuhn loss in the narrow sense, threatening to undo the 
structural continuity claim. 
 
Alas for Radder, one plain fact has been neglected. Poiseuille’s law was never 
abandoned! It is in use today and can be found in numerous scientific textbooks. If it 
is still in use, then it was never lost, i.e. it is not a Kuhn loss. Having said this, 
Poiseuille’s law presents another problem for (structural) realism. Up till now we 
have required that old structures be suitably preserved in new structures. Poiseuille’s 
law is preserved but independently of any new structure. This contradicts what we 
required previously, namely that all successful predecessor structures have 
corresponding successor structures. 
 
Despite appearances, the game is not lost for the (structural) realist. Some realists will 
no doubt argue that Poiseuille’s law will eventually be derived from quantum 
mechanics. Bar that prospect, I want to maintain that there is nothing dire about the 
independent survival of a predictively and explanatorily successful structure. The 
structural continuity claim merely needs to be amended. New paradigms, theories or 
structures need not replace old ones in toto. That is, they need not range over all the 
old domains of phenomena, though we certainly expect them to unify a substantial 
chunk of the old domains with new domains of phenomena. So long as the 
unaccounted for domains are preserved nothing is really lost. Designations like ‘the 
successor’ are therefore clearly hyperbolic. The same point can be demonstrated in a 
much simpler way by reminding oneself of the fact that there exist two successors to 
the Newtonian paradigm, i.e. relativity theory and quantum mechanics. 
 
This brings us to the final qualification of premise one. 
 
1d. All and only operative structural elements of scientific theories have been (and 
will be) preserved through theory change either (a) intact by derivation or (b) via a 
transformation from new to old structure that is either (i) continuous or (ii) partially 
discontinuous or (c) intact but independent of any currently accepted structures. 
 
6. Inferences from Preservation 
Premises two and three of the structural continuity argument add up to the following 
claim: The preservation of an element is a necessary and sufficient condition of its 
(approximate) truth.12 No realist, I hope, ought to be happy to adopt such a strong 
claim. The preservation of an element through theory change is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for its (approximate) truth. 
 
It is not a necessary condition because the preservation of a(n) (approximately) true 
element is not guaranteed. An element might be cast aside because it is, or at least it 
seems to be, incompatible with certain parts of other theories. Perhaps instruments 
capable of assessing its empirical merits have not yet been invented. Even worse, it 
might be that no instrument capable for this assessment can be constructed.13 Thus an 
(approximately) true element may find itself thrown into the wastebasket of history. 
                                                 
12
 That the third premise amounts to preservation being a necessary condition of an element’s 
(approximate) truth is more clearly seen when formulated in its contrapositive form, i.e. the 
(approximate) truth of an element implies its preservation. 
13
 This last scenario finds support in some interpretations of the measurement problem in quantum 
mechanics. 
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Kuhn losses, in the narrow construal of the concept, are therefore genuine 
possibilities.  
 
Far from being outlandish, the necessity condition’s failure can be witnessed in the 
actual historical record. Take the central claim of the kinetic theory of heat. The idea 
that heat is due to the motion of particles can be traced back to antiquity. It thereafter 
vanished only to reappear in the sixteenth century. Francis Bacon famously remarked 
that ‘heat itself, its essence and its quiddity, is motion and nothing else’. Yet it was 
not until the nineteenth century when the work of bold experimentalists like Count 
Rumford, Humphry Davy and James Prescott Joule as well as the advent of new ideas 
like energy conservation allowed the successful development and rise to dominance 
of the kinetic theory of heat. To those itching to point out that the kinetic theory’s 
central claim did eventually survive, it is worth reminding that premise three is 
tenseless. In other words, one should be able to apply the inference at any historical 
period, including the period between antiquity and the sixteenth century and not 
merely from the sixteenth century onward. It is also worth reminding that we could 
not be talking about a specific (approximately) true element that did not survive 
(during some period) unless that element did in due course survive. Needless to say 
that some (approximately) true elements may never be rediscovered.   
 
Preservation is not a sufficient condition because the mere survival of a given element 
does not guarantee its (approximate) truth. This point has also been made by Hasok 
Chang (2003), though for reasons that do not exactly coincide with mine. Preservation 
does not guarantee (approximate) truth because it might simply be a by-product of the 
conservativeness of scientific theorizing. A well-document aspect of this 
conservativeness is our penchant for anthropomorphic, anthropocentric and 
teleological explanations. Thus for a long time it was natural to suppose the truth of 
the principle that an external force is required to keep things in motion. Our trust in 
this principle, as is well known, was withdrawn as a consequence of our acceptance of 
the law of inertia. 
 
A strict preservationist will no doubt protest against both my necessity and sufficiency 
objections. Had the scientific community been able to test the elements at issue 
sooner, the preservationist will insist, they would have surely uncovered their 
empirical merits or lack thereof. Thus (approximately) true elements would be duly 
preserved and (approximately) false ones duly abandoned. Though this statement is 
largely correct, notice that now the empirical merits of elements take centre stage, not 
their state of preservation. In a nutshell, the issue of preservation becomes parasitic on 
the issue of empirical merits. 
 
It has not been my intention to dismiss preservation as a hopeless concept but rather 
to shed light on its scope and the origin of its strength. It is still true after all, 
especially in more recent times, that preservation and (approximate) truth are 
substantially correlated. This correlation can be explained by the fact that scientists 
are now more likely than they once were to preserve those components that have 
empirical merits. It is for that reason highly unlikely that narrowly construed Kuhn 
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losses will be found in abundance.14 This brings us to the final modification of the 
structural continuity argument. 
 
1e. Approximately all and only operative structural elements of scientific theories 
have been (and will be) preserved through theory change either (a) intact by 
derivation, or (b) via a transformation from new to old structure that is either 
(i) continuous or (ii) partially discontinuous or (c) intact but independent of 
any currently accepted structures. 
2a. Preservation is a reliable guide to (approximate) truth. 
3a. Non-preservation is a reliable guide to (approximate) falsity. 
∴   The preservation of approximately all and only operative structural elements 
of scientific theories through theory change either via (a), (b) or (c) is a 
reliable guide to their (approximate) truth. The non-preservation of non-
structural elements and inoperative structural elements is a reliable guide to 
their (approximate) falsity. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I do not expect what has been said above to be the final word on these matters. The 
more one studies the history of science the more one finds cases that deserve special 
attention. This in turn translates into amendments of the premises of the structural 
continuity argument and ultimately amendments of the structural continuity claim 
itself. These amendments will probably continue the tendency of relaxing the link 
between preservation and (approximate) truth. For this reason it is perhaps better to 
think of the structural continuity argument as inductively strong rather than as 
deductive. I hope that this essay has laid the foundation for a more focused debate on 
the shared commitments, desiderata and limits of structural realists. 
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